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CLASSICAL AND CROSS INSIDER TRADING:
VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF RULE 10b-5
*NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been intense enforcement and scrutiny
of the insider trading laws. It is still advisable, however, to examine
the insider trading rules for their coherence and consistency. This
article only explores the insider trading rules as they apply to
trading by traditional insiders-the management team and its tem-
porary members from the professional ranks such as bankers, law-
yers, and accountants-all of whom owe fiduciary duties to the
employer corporation and its shareholders.
The purpose of this article is to uncover an inconsistency in the
reasoning behind insider trading regulation of this traditional group.1
* S.J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School. Member, New York Bar. I would like to
express my gratitude to Professor Reinier Kraakman of the Harvard Law School for
his invaluable help in the supervision of my dissertation, to which this article is related.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Giddeon Shor, Matthew Kreeger, Alan
Nadelhaft, and Bryan Askew.
I Quite different policy considerations are involved in the issue of tipper/tippee
liability: the efficient dissemination of information, its value to market participants, and
the role of investment analysts. Thus, the issue of tipper/tippee liability should be
addressed separately. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See generally D.G. LANGE-
VOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION (1988); H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV.
857 (1983); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rulo on the Internal Effieicnty of the
Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982); Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic
Information on Impersonal Stock Markets; Wh'o is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom
under SEC Rule lob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
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The present regulations address the fiduciaries' trading in the stock
of corporations to whom a fiduciary duty is owed. Trading on the
basis of inside information in stock of entities with which the trader
has no fiduciary relationship is not proscribed. To illustrate, if the
management of corporation A knows that A will offer to enter into
a contract with corporation B, thereby greatly enhancing B's value,
members of A's management team are free to trade in B's stock
based on this "inside" information because they owe no fiduciary
duties to B's shareholders. This article will examine this phenome-
non and will assess the desirability of this form of trading, which
will be called cross trading, connoting insider trading that crosses
corporate boundaries.' The traditional form of insider trading will
be referred to as classical insider trading.
The first federal proscription on insider trading was section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 The persons regulated by
section 16 often are referred to as statutory insiders; they must
adhere to the requirements of section 16, which, among other things,
require them to disclose transactions to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Classical insider trading also breaches the primary
proscription against insider trading under Rule 10b-54 as construed
by the United States Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States.5
This proscription is based on the theory that insiders buying or
selling stock of their corporation without disclosing that inside
information breach their fiduciary duty to disclose, which they owe
to shareholders. The traders' nondisclosure in violation of the duty
to disclose and their subsequent trading amount to a fraud violating
Rule 10b-5.
The status of cross insider trading under Rule 10b-5 is ambiguous.
After Carpenter v. United States,6 a person who engages in cross
insider trading risks prosecution under the misappropriation theory
of Rule 10b-5. Criminal liability mpy also arise under the federal
mail and wire fraud statutes.7 The misappropriation theory is an
I The term "outsider trading" is used more often. See, e.g., Aldave, Misappropriation:
A General Theory for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 112
(1984) (citing Freeman, The Insider Trading Sanctions Bill-A Neglected Opportunity, 4
PACE L. REV. 221 (1984)). See also Bagby, Outsider Misappropriation: Carpenter v. United
States, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 204 (1988). "Cross insider trading" will be used to distinguish
this trading from the universe of outsiders and to emphasize that cross insider trading
is just a variation of insider trading.
15 U.S.C. S 78p (1988). The first instance of state proscription of insider trading
arose in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
5 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
7 18 U.S.C. 5 1341 (1988) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire, radio, and television fraud).
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interpretation of Rule 10b-5 intended to reach cross insider trading
by arguing that a trader's use for profit of information "misappro-
priated" from another entity, such as the corporation where the
trader is employed, amounts to a fraud against the employer, vio-
lating Rule 10b-5. In spite of these efforts against cross trading,
one could argue that the crosstraders' actions are less central to
the concerns of the securities laws than classical insider trading.
The peculiar split of the Court in Carpenter' lends credence to this
position. This article intends to show, however, that cross insider
trading is more undesirable than its classical counterpart, given the
balance of policy concerns underlying the regulation of insider
trading.
The first part of this article reviews the intense scholarly debate
over classical insider trading, which was identified and prohibited
long before cross trading. Indeed, cross insider trading rules could
develop only after the classical form was defined to exclude cross
trading transactions, which happened in Chiarella. This part will
also introduce an analysis of the shareholder injury attributed to
insider trading using the fraud-on-the-market theory. The article's
second part discusses the compelling policy considerations justifying
the prohibition of cross insider trading. In conclusion, suggestions
are made for improvements on the insider trading regulatory scheme.
CLASSICAL INSIDER TRADING
Background
The history of insider trading's proscription closely follows the
history of interpreting Rule 10b-5. Only recently has the Securities
and Exchange Commission expanded the source of the proscription
by adopting more rules, such as the tender offer insider trading
Rule 14e-3.9
The SEC's regulation of insider trading as a form of fraud vio-
lating Rule 10b-5 began with In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 1o The Second
Circuit embraced the SEC's view in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1988).
10 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). There, a member of a securities firm managing discretionary
accounts sold stock on behalf of all the accounts upon receipt of inside information. The
"disclose or abstain" theory was introduced in a disciplinary action against the manager:
"[I]nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known,
would affect their investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these circum-
stances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If ... disclosure ... would be
improper... the alternative is to forego the transaction." Id. at 911.
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Co.," accepting the "disclose or abstain [from trading on material
nonpublic information]" interpretation of 10b-5. Chiarella, however,
established that the breach of a duty to disclose is necessary for a
10b-5 fraud. 12 There, Chiarella, a financial printer for the acquiring
corporation in a merger, was convicted for trading in stock of the
target corporations. But he was exonerated by the Supreme Court
because, being employed by the acquirer, he had no duty to disclose
this information to the target's shareholders. The Court thus limited
the "disclose or abstain" rule to cases in which trading breaches a
fiduciary duty (to disclose the inside information) owed to fellow
shareholders on the other side of the transaction.
Chiarella came as a shock to the SEC, because the Court over-
turned a conviction for what was then the most patently unfair
form of insider trading. The SEC responded by promulgating Rule
14e-3,'13 which forbids all trading on information about impending
mergers. Thereafter, the SEC pursued a different interpretation of
Rule 10b-5, the misappropriation theory, in order to overcome the
limitations of Chiarella in areas that Rule 14e-3 would not reach.
Meanwhile, a seemingly unrelated aspect of Rule 10b-5 arose. The
courts interpreted Rule 10b-5 to mandate public disclosure of merger
negotiations. Neither this facet of 10b-5, nor insider trading law
generally, is yet crystallized. The participants in the merger or
other business combination must avoid making any statements or
omissions that amount to "material misrepresentations" because by
doing so they would be perpetrating a fraud violating Rule 10b-5
upon all those who traded at prices affected by the misrepresen-
tations. In other words, management has a duty not to mislead
investors transacting in the company's shares about their value.
It is interesting to note that the two aspects of Rule 1Ob-5
interpretation, the insider trading proscription and the disclosure
mandate, have followed quite different roads. For the sake of con-
sistency and clarity, there should be an effort at unifying the two
approaches. The policy debate on classical insider trading regulation
should provide insight into the necessity and extent of its prohibi-
,1 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, employees traded on their inside
information about their corporation's major copper ore strike. In an en banc decision,
the Second Circuit found for the SEC, embracing the "disclose or abstain" theory.
"[Anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or, ... must abstain from trading . Id. at 848.
12 "Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable
under § 10(b).... But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." 445 U.S. at 230.
11 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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tion. And the fact that this prohibition is mandatory, that a corpo-
ration cannot choose to avoid the proscription of insider trading,
also should inform the policy debate.
Insider trading encompasses forms too mild to be prohibited and
others so unfair that they do not require any further express
prohibition beyond the general fraud rules. At the mild end of the
spectrum is trading by statutory insiders who earn returns higher
than the average market participant 14 by trading on the softest
nonpublic information -their expectations for the future, which are
not sufficiently material to violate the prohibition on insider trading.
At the other end of the spectrum is the fiduciary who actually sells
confidential factual information. By deriving personal profit from
the disclosure of confidential information, the manager/agent vio-
lates basic principles of agency law.15 The question is not whether,
but to what extent, to ban insider trading. At which point on this
spectrum should the line be drawn?
The relevant policy considerations must also justify the manda-
tory character of the prohibition on insider trading. For example,
arguments that emphasize insider trading's effects on the share-
holders of a particular firm (firm-specific arguments) fail this test,
because individual firms should be expected to prohibit it them-
selves if they are harmed. 16
Shareholder Injury
The first issue to explore is the potential for direct pecuniary
harm to investors by the insiders. A less direct kind of injury
introduced by Professor Wang also will be examined. According to
Wang, insider trading leaves the "wrong" amount of stock in the
hands of the public-less on a price rise and more on a price drop-
and this indicates that outside shareholders are disadvantaged by
insider trading.
7
11 See generally Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.L.
REV. 863, 879 (1987) (citing, inter alia, Basel & Stein, The Value of Information: Some
Inferences from the Probability of Insider Trading, 14 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 553,
567-69 (1979); Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141, 1142 (1976)).
11 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 395 (1958); Strong v. Repide, 213
U.S. 419 (1909); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
1" See, e.g., Bebchuck, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 670 (1984)
(questioning the disclosure provisions of the securities laws). But see F. Easterbrook &
D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1986) (draft from chapter of a
prospective book) (advocating no mandatory provisions in corporate law).
17 Wang, supra note 1, at 1234.
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Injury Under Basic: Fraud on the Market
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court went a long way
toward including in its legal analysis the latest theory of market
mechanics. 8 The same analytical tools used implicitly in Basic, the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (hereinafter CAPM) and the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis (hereinafter ECMH), illustrate the in-
jury caused by insider trading.
The ECMH and CAPM claim that market price is not a result of
supply and demand but of the risks and expectations the market
assigns to each stock. All other things being equal, stocks with the
same volatility rate or risk, often noted as the stock's "beta," are
perfect substitutes, and investors will not prefer one to the other.
A minute change in price, if it is not related to a change in the
expected return from the stock, will drive the market participants
to take advantage of what they see as mispricing. As soon as price
rises with no explanation, investors will take their profits and
purchase more of the still-cheap stock of other corporations with
the same beta. The CAPM predicts the opposite when the stock
price drops. This leads to a large elasticity of supply and to an
almost infinite supply at a price level slightly above the previous
equilibrium.19
Thus, information that would alter expectations is the most im-
portant determinant of price, while the effects of supply and demand
IS Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (unanimously affirming a conviction for
mail and wire fraud but splitting 44 on the securities fraud violations). In Basic, the
Court accepted a variation of "fraud on the market" theory, id. at 990-91, 993 ("It is not
inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on.the-market
theory."). There are two variations of fraud-on-the-market: (1) the variation creating a
rebuttable presumption of reliance on the misrepresentation that causes the price to be
at the level it assumes (the form accepted by Baoic); and (2) a stronger variation that
conclusively presumes causation, claiming that trading at misinformed prices is tanta
mount to being defrauded, The Baoic Court did not accept this latter formulation. The
practical importance of the distinction is lessened by the fact that rebuttal of the
presumption of reliance in the former version is very difficult. Additionally, because
rebuttal consists to a large extent of negating the efficiency of capital markets (when
it takes the form that the market was not affected by the misrepresentation and thus
did not "rely"), to that extent it is identical to negating the prerequisites for the
application of the fraud on-the-market theory, which is founded on the assumption that
capital markets are efficient (i.e., that prices reflect all public information).
19 This hypothesis is confirmed by empirical data. For example, Edper Enterprises
bought 25% of Bracan Limited on the market with minor price movement. Then, after
a press release disavowing its intent to take over Brascan, Edper managed to accumulate
over 50% of the stock without significant price movement, Soc Carney Oupra note 14,
at 888, 889-90, citing Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,882, at 95,617, 95,618-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
1990 I Insider Trading / 115
(or volume effects) are only secondary determinants of market
price. 20 The CAPM model suggests that insider trading affects stock
prices through expectations, not through supply and demand.
Insider trading detected by the markets will itself affect share
price because it is one more piece of information for market parti-
cipants.21 There are three possible connections between the detec-
tion of insider trading and stock price changes: (1) insider trading
may go undetected, causing little or no price change, (2) it may be
detected and have the same effect on the price as full disclosure,
or (3) it may be detected but have a muted effect on price.
No Effect on Price. If the market price is not affected by insider
trading, the insider's trade does not cause the outsider's trading on
the opposite side. As Carney explains, if the buy orders of insiders
cannot be met by sellers on the market, then market makers or
specialists are forced to trade, not the investors. 22 Carney proceeds
to note that if insider trading is costly to the market makers, they
should be expected to harmlessly adjust the bid/ask spread in order
to account for the expense. It should be observed, however, that
this effect would not be harmless, because it would increase trans-
action costs at the expense of other investors and of market liquid-
ity.
Individual investors, however, are the least hurt by this extra
transaction cost generated by insider trading. Professionals, not lay
investors, account for most of the trading volume and they suffer
the most from transaction costs. In addition, Carney argues that
individual investors would rather allocate the right to trade on
10 Even without accepting the modern portfolio theory (ECMH and CAPM), infor-
mation romaine a moot important mover of share prices. Investors probably accept the
current market price as reflecting the current value of the firm, and each new bit of
information tends to move price accordingly. If modern portfolio theory is not accepted
then supply and demand still affect price. In such a case, even undisclosed inside trading
will have some effect on prices boecausoe it would move prices upward by increasing
demand or downward by increasing supply. The effect of information, however, is not
lessened.
21 Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 629-
32 (1984) ("[T]he price effect of insider trading is an example of what we have called
derivatively informed trading mechanism. As a result of price or trade decoding-
deducing the content of private information from transitory price fluctuations or the
identity of traders-the market 'learns' the relevance of the insider's private information
from their own trading activity, and the price of the security changes to reflect the
market's new information."). For example, a sudden rise in the trading volume of a
prime takeover candidate suggectz to the market that private information probably
drives this activity. The market will price accordingly.
Carney, supra note 14, at 888-89.
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inside information to insiders, who might then accept lower pay. 23
This argument will be considered again. 24 In sum, the effects of
insider trading that leaves price unaffected do not seem to indicate
injury to shareholders.
Next we consider a form of injury involving misrepresentation:
that the insiders trade on secret information, thereby defrauding
shareholders who unknowingly trade at wrong prices. In Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson,25 the Supreme Court observed, in the context of dis-
closing merger negotiations, that "misleading statements ... defraud
purchasers of stock even if they do not directly rely on the mis-
statements, 26 because they trade at a fraudulent price. From here
it is only a short stop to saying that the failure to disclose material
information in the context of insider trading similarly defrauds all
those who trade on the fraudulent market price.27 If so, then all
insider trading constitutes a fraud on all those trading contempo-
raneously opposite insiders. The crucial element, however, would
not be insider trading per se but the nondisclosure of material
information. 28 Such nondisclosure leads to mispricing, which yields
fraud on the market.
The weak link in this legal syllogism is the disclosure requirement
imposed on the insiders. Unless there is such a disclosure require-
ment, the insiders' nondisclosure will be lawful. If there is no duty
to disclose, there can be no liability for the resulting mispricing.
But since the above analysis concerns classical insider trading, even
an analysis limited by the requirement of a duty to disclose based
on a fiduciary relationship will suffice to yield a proscription, be-
cause such a relationship exists between the classical insider and
the shareholders. Fiduciaries have been held to have a duty to
See Carney, supra note 14, at 897. See also Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of
Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1449, 1478-79 (1986); infra text accompanying notes
54-56.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 54-56. The opposite argument can also be made:
the general public participates in the market, not by direct stock ownership, but
principally through institutions such as pension funds, life insurance, and mutual funds.
Thc public should want its investments, not the insiders, to benefit from the ban on
insider trading. Research comparing the two schemes is needed. The fundholder would
lilicly prefer a direct fund benefit to unregulated insider trading.
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Id. (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
' See supra note 18.
If the price of the stock reaches the same level it would have reached after a
disclosure, then there would be no injury. The price is not artificially inflated as if by
misstatement, but reflects actual developments. There are other considerations mainly
associated with the traders on the same side as the insider; these will be discussed
infra at the text accompanying notes 29-30.
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"disclose or abstain from trading."29 Notice that injury from insider
trading is found here by using Rule 10b-5 in a way that it is not
traditionally used in insider trading cases.
Full Price Rise. If insider trading causes share prices to rise to
the level they would have reached had there been full disclosure,
two aspects of injury would have to be examined: the possible
injury to investors who traded opposite the insider, and the possible
injury to those trading on the same side with the insider. Investors
trading opposite the insider do not seem to be worse off. On the
contrary, they get the payoff of their investment sooner than if
they had waited for the information to become public in the usual
ways. They have the double benefits of interest payments on their
cash and an earlier end to their exposure to market risks. Otherwise,
they would have had to wait for a disclosure that would result in
the same price movement in order to liquidate their positions.
Paradoxically, the investor who trades on the same side as the
insider will have a stronger claim of injury, because he buys a
security at a price that already is high. If it is publicly known that
insiders have traded, the securities buyer should also know that
the price may be elevated, because news whose announcement he
is anticipating might already be reflected in current market price
through insider trading. The investor trades, nevertheless, because
he assumes that the price still will move favorably. Either insider
trading did not move price all the way to the level it would reach
after disclosure, or the insider trading was motivated by information
different from the information on which the investor based his
trades.
If, by contrast, the investor is not aware of insider trading, then
the investor can claim to be deprived of the profits otherwise
attainable. This investor has assumed the risk of owning a specific
stock in order to profit from his analysis. The elevated price at
which such an investor traded was a result of insider trading. The
purchaser is injured by not being informed that the recent price
rise is attributable to insider trading. This injury is fraudulent
because this insider trading involves material information which the
insiders must disclose due to their fiduciary link to the shareholders.
Once injury is established, the injured investor need not establish
reliance on the misrepresentation. Basic suggests that it is possible
to presume reliance through "fraud on the market." This means
that the investor (a market participant to whom the insider is linked
11 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) ("a corporate insider
must abstain from trading ... unless he has first disclosed ....").
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by a fiduciary bond) relied on the misinformation by trading at an
artificial market price. 30
Partial Price Rise. In the third case, the stock price does not rise
to the level it would reach with full disclosure. In this situation,
the analysis for investors trading on the same side with the insiders
will not differ from the analysis presented above. Therefore, it is
only necessary to focus on the insiders' counterparties,
Here, investors who traded opposite the insiders are better off
than they would have been had no insider trading occurred. If the
information is material (which presumably is the case if it causes
the stock price to rise 31), the investors will be allowed to claim the
extra profit they would have enjoyed with full disclosure, using a
line of reasoning similar to that employed above for the case of no
price movement. Investors invoking the "fraud on the market"
theory need not prove that they relied on the insider's misrepre-
sentation, because reliance is presumed. Furthermore, investors'
knowledge that insider trading caused the price rise does not affect
the reasoning in this case. Their loss is the difference between the
price at which they sold and the price after disclosure. Even if the
investors know that insider trading caused the price rise, they will
not necessarily expect further price movement. For investors to
expect this, one would have to argue that the mere existence of
insider trading should warn traders of further volatility. Arguably,
the current price represents discounting by the market for the
uncertain message contained in insider trading, and the fact that in
practice it might take a long time for the markets to reach an
accurate price, in which case investors may be presumed to be
warned of further volatility when insiders are trading. This line of
reasoning, however, is much too complex to be imputed to investors
and used to erode their legal protection.
The search for a tort-like injury caused by insider trading led to
Rule 10b-5 and its disclosure requirements, the sources of the "fraud
on the market" theory. One hopes that both aspects of Rule 10b-5
form one coherent theory. In the above analyses, however, nondis-
closure played a crucial role in linking insider trading to injury.
This suggests that speedier disclosure requirements might diminish
. This reasoning is based, of course, on several assumptions: nondisclosure of material
information; trading by insiders; and a price rise caused by the informational effect of
insider trading, while this trading is not known to the public. This information, however,
usually will be considered material since the test for materiality-whcther a reasonable
shareholder would consider the information important -is easily passed. See TSC Indus.
v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
1, See supra note 30.
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the harm from insider trading by disseminating the news of such
trading, which will cause quicker and more accurate pricing.
In sum, the CAPM and "fraud on the market" theories form the
analytical basis used to consider how insider trading causes injury
to investors. These theories suggest that insider trading is undesir-
able; its undesirability, however, stems not from insider trading as
such, but from its secret nature.
Wang's View: Insider Trading Causes Redistribution of Price
Moves in Favor of Insiders
Professor Wang 2 explains that insider trading causes less stock
to be held by the public on a price rise and more on a price drop.
He argues that insiders act in anticipation of the price movement
by adjusting their holdings. The result is that insiders hold com-
paratively more of the stock on price rises and less on price falls.
Consequently, the returns of stock price movements are unevenly
redistributed from investors to insiders. Although Wang's view is
plausible, it is hard to assess. Since insider trading accounts for a
minuscule fraction of the overall trading volume,3 3 it is unlikely that
insiders' trades cause any major redistribution of the stock and its
returns from outsiders to insiders. This harmful effect consists of
an injury to the shareholders, based on the statistically supported
assumption that insiders usually trade on correct predictions. Any
specific insider trading transaction, however, does not necessarily
belong to the group of trades made on correct predictions and thus
might not have this effect. Due to this loose causal connection
between trading and its harm, the Wang view is not a compelling
argument for proscribing insider trading. It does, however, indicate
a harmful effect of insider trading which has to be taken into account
in order to determine whether a proscription of insider trading is
warranted.
Market Efficiency
It is also important to consider the effect of insider trading on
market efficiency. The proper inquiry is whether insider trading
Wang, supra note 1, at 1234.
Heller, ChiareUa, S.E.C. Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory,
37 Buc, LAW. 517, 556 (1982) (mentioning that inrider trading amounts to "a tiny fraction
of one percent of the volume of trading," quoting the Chairman of the SEC at a then
recent interview, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1981, at D1). The Chairman may have changed
his mind after the Bocoky affair. It is, however, unlikely that the "tiny fraction of one
percent" need be revised greatly upward. In addition, the Boesky affair included cross-
trading and tipper-tippee issues which do not affect the reasoning here.
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enhances market efficiency and is therefore desirable. Two main
arguments connect market efficiency with insider trading.3 4 The
first stipulates that insider trading adjusts share prices towards
their "true" level, enhancing market efficiency. It will be shown
that this view is mistaken given the current regulation of insider
trading, although it could be valid were that regulation amended to
require speedier disclosure. The second argument is that the free-
dom to engage in insider trading induces managers to release
information to the market. Although commentators take different
positions on this issue, it will be suggested that insider trading
does accelerate the flow of information to the markets. Finally, upon
comparison of insider trading with stock options, it will bc 3ubmittcd
that options do not induce as great an acceleration in the flow of
information as insider trading.
Price Efficiency
If insider trading drives prices towards their "true" level, it
promotes market efficiency. The traditional view has been that
insider trading performs this function through supply and demand.
Modern finance theory, by contrast, holds that price movements
depend more on information than on supply and demand 3 5 although
m The necessity of efficient markets might not be so obvious. However, efficient
markets induce efficient allocation of capital rcsources. Capital markets exist to enable
corporations to issue securities and thereby raise money for corporate purposes. Estab-
lishing the "right" prices for securities benefits society by allocating the "right" amount
of capital to each firm, so that the most capital goes to the best user of it, and the least
to the worst.
Further, when securities prices reflect the "true" value of the underlying securities,
the risk of owning securities is much less than in an inefficient market because the
value of the securities will bear a constant relationship to the real value of the underlying
security. This will reduce the risk of owning securities, which will make investors value
securities more highly and will reduce the cost of capital to issuers, since securities will
command higher prices. The virtues of efficient capital markets are described in Lorie,
Insider Trading: Rule lob 5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 819 (1980). See also Kahan, Normative Aspects of Stock Market Efficiency (research
paper), Cf. Stout, The Unimportanwe of Being Efficient: An Economic Anlysis of Stock
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988).
Efficiont markets also help takeovers work efficiently. If market prices are erratic,
acquirers face additional risk; low prices will induce excess takeover activity, while high
prices will inhibit useful takeovers and entrench inefficient management. See Kraakman,
Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Dico euaed" Shav P', uan Acluim
sition Motive, 88 COLum. L. REV. 891 (1988).
m See Carney, supra note 14, at 889-90 (referring to Scholes, The Market For Securities:
Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Infornuition on Share Prices, 45 J.
Bus. 179 (1972)). See also Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and The Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 336; Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 21, at 629-34.
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the two are not always easy to distinguish. Consequently, insider
trading does not by itself drive prices to their correct level and
does not enhance market efficiency. Efficiency, therefore, can only
be enhanced through the informational effect of insider trading-
through the effect of public knowledge or suspicion of such trading.
Secret insider trading will not affect prices.
3 6
Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act 37 requires that statutory insiders
report all changes in their equity stock holdings (effectively, their
trades) by the tenth of the next month. This rule leaves a period
of ten to forty days for reporting-far from an effective way to
disseminate information to today's markets. Were the reporting
concurrent with the trades, information about insider trading would
reach the markets immediately, having the proper effect on prices.
Such an amendment of the applicable law has been endorsed by
commentators.38
Flow of Information to the Markets
Academic theorists have considered the effect of insider trading
on the flow of information about the corporation to the markets.3 9
Since the incentive created by insider trading to release information
to the markets is derivative, it is not surprising that the commen-
tators' suggestions in this area differ enormously. Professor Scott,40
for example, distinguishes between good news and bad. According
to Scott, managers have sufficient incentives to disclose good news
without delay because they too will benefit from the price rise such
a disclosure will cause. Indeed, their compensation is often tied to
stock performance, as is the value of their human capital. Insider
trading has the undesirable effect of encouraging them to delay the
news in order to accumulate stock before the announcement. By
contrast, management has a disincentive to air bad news. Only
through insider trading and the information it would inject into the
Trades too largo to be executed in the anonymity of the trading floor go through
the more personal "block trading" specialists or "upstairs" brokers. In such cases, it is
harder to maintain secrecy. Large-scale insider trading is thus likely to be discovered.
15 U.S.C. S 78p (1988).
See generally Gilron & Kraalunan, supra note 21, at 632 (favorably conoidering
preregistration of trades); Samuelsono, Tve P? eventi n of Insider Ti odli y. A P upostl ful,
Revising Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 511 (1988)
(proposing preregistration).
1 V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, CASES AND MATERIALS 1024
(3d ed. 1987).
40 Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 801 (1980), excerpted in R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 120 (1980).
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markets would this bleak information be released quickly. Other-
wise, management would suppress it as long as possible in order to
prevent its negative effect on stock prices.41
Professor Clark42 maintains that insider trading always delays
the disclosure of information about the corporation to the markets,
because insiders need time to trade on their knowledge. The prem
ises of his argument are faulty, however. Major stocks are so liquid
that institutional investors can move huge blocks virtually instan-
taneously without moving prices. 43 At the same time, insider trading
accounts for only a "tiny fraction of one percent of the volume of
trading."44 There is no doubt that insiders can trade instantaneously
without moving prices. Because the price change will immediately
follow the release of such information, and the insiders presumably
want to bear the risks of investing in stocks as briefly as possible
(in order to put their assets back into their favorite long-term
investments), the insiders have an incentive to release the infor-
mation immediately after they trade.45
Thus, both Clark and Scott may be wrong insofar as they claim
that freedom to engage in insider trading might delay the release
of information to the markets. Instead, it is submitted that insider
trading accelerates the flow of information to the markets.
Compensation through options, by contrast, spurs management to
release good news quickly, but to sit on bad news. Indeed, a manager
can never profit from airing bad news. She will not even be able
to profit from the rebound of the price (after the fall) because
options have a fixed strike price and can only be exercised once. In
fact, the manager could profit from this rebound only if the corpo-
41 Scott, supra note 40, also notes that a general disclosure rule might well be in the
offing, citing the discussion of the grounds for liability in Financial Indus. Fund v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973). His prediction was correct, since
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), is a large step in that direction.
42 R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 268, § 8.2.3 (1986).
0 Stern (moderator), A Discussion of Corporate Financial Information, 2 MIDLAND
CORP. FIN. J. 40, 50-51 (Spring 1984) (discussion by McConnell) ("There may be some 300
firms that all institutional investors can take a position in, stocks which offer the liquidity
to get in and out without moving prices around.").
" See supra note 33. The small amount of insider trading volume also decreases the
importance of all causation foundations for insider trading regulation, in particular
Wang's argument that insider trading leaves the wrong amount of stock on the market.
45 One could argue that insiders want to trade on more stock than they can manage
by using only their own funds and the margin given by the brokerage houses. In such
a case, the manager might want to obtain a "no questions asked" loan a not perfectly
legal loan. The manager will need time not for the trade itself, but for the loan
arrangement. However, this scenario is not realistic. It is not a reason to conclude that
insider trading will lead to market inefficiency.
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ration rushed to replace its options or to revise downward the
strike price after the price drop and before the rise. But it is
questionable whether such swift corporate action is likely.
In sum, the market efficiency logic does not provide a clear
conclusion on the desirability of insider trading. First, the oppor-
tunity for secret insider trading available under the delayed disclo-
sure mandated by current regulation negates any potentially useful
effect from such trading's driving prices to their "right" level. Also,
insider trading sometimes has the beneficial effect of inducing
quicker disclosure, while compensation with options is inferior in
this respect.
Agency Costs
The final stage in evaluating the desirability of insider trading is
its effect on agency costs. 46 Axiomatically, minimizing agency costs
benefits shareholders and enhances firm efficiency. Commentators
have suggested that insider trading minimizes agency costs by
reducing management's salary, by aligning the risk preferences of
management with those of shareholders, and by "signalling" com-
petent managers. 47 A comparison of the effects of insider trading
with those of compensation packages including options 48 or bonuses,
however, shows that their effects are comparable to those forwarded
by the advocates of unrestrained insider trading.
Pay Reduction
This argument, which assumes a very efficient market for man-
agerial services, stipulates that if insider trading is allowed, com-
petition will cause wages to decline by the amount of the expected
trading profits-all to the shareholders' benefit. Although there is
no evidence of such behavior,49 there is also no harm in analyzing
the claim.
If managerial wages are reduced, the balance of management's
compensation over salary comes from those shareholders' trades
occurring before the events about which insiders trade. Sharehold-
See R. POSNER & K. ScoT, supra note 40, at 3940 (agency costs are the sum of
principal's monitoring expenditures, agent's bonding expenditures, and the residual loss);
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Oum-
ership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305 (1976).
11 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 867 ("[B]etter managers will signal their
quality by their willingness to tie a higher proportion of their compensation to stock
performance.").
Compensation packages using any of thc various forms of options are substantively
the same.
49 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 859.
124 / Vol. 28 / American Business Law Journal
ers who do not trade reap the benefits of lower management
compensation at the expense of trading shareholders.
Under this scheme, however, not all shareholders participate pro
rata in management's pay. If fairness is equality of returns among
shareholders, then this arrangement, by which shareholders who do
not trade are advantaged, is unfair. Some shareholders finance
management's pay by trading; the rest get a free ride. Easterbrook
answers that the market may discount all shares for insider trading
and that shareholders who lose in one transaction win the rest of
the time due to the increased returns. 50 But his response does not
eliminate the inequality in returns; it merely asserts that the bets
on stocks are fair. Shareholders who trade less frequently will still
outperform the rest.51 But in addition to concluding that this result
of insider trading is unfair, we should identify the frequent traders
and the long-term passive investors. Members of the professional
investment community trade more frequently than other investors.5 2
Does the investment community need protection -against inequality
and oppression by individual investors, who are the less frequent
traders? Some say that insider trading regulation benefits the
professional investment community.5 3
Haddock and Macey- and Carney 55 explain that once insiders are
forbidden to trade, market professionals, seeking such information
by vocation, will take advantage of it rather than the shareholders,
who have other full-time occupations. These authors argue that
shareholders would rather allocate the profits of inside information
to management in order to benefit the corporation, by means of a
pay cut or as an extra incentive to management, than let the market
professionals reap it.
In rebuttal, one should examine the interests represented by
institutional investors. The investment community manages pension
0 Easterbrook, supra note 35, at 325 (citing Scott, supra note 40, at 807-09).
1, It is interesting to note that a similar problem arises when an issuer repurchases
its stock; the sellers finance the price rise. Repurchases of stock by the issuing
corporation are fundamentally similar to insider trading: an information-rich entity buys
shares from information-poor dispersed shareholders. The legitimacy of repurchases by
tender offer depends on proper disclosure. See SEC Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. S 240.13e-4
(1988), promulgated under section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(e) (1988).
2 Stern, supra note 43, at 45 (discussion by J. Stern) (2,200 traders account for 88%
of the daily trading volume in the N.Y.S.E.).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 54-56. See also Haddock & Macey, supra note
23, at 1458-59.
4 Haddock & Macey, supra note 23, at 1478-79.
1 Carney, supra note 14, at 897.
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funds and other collectively owned ascets; the beneficiaries of thorc
funds might prefer to take the chance that their fund will benefit
by using information that cannot be used by the insiders. In such
a setting, the beneficiaries would prefer that the market profes-
sionals obtain the information rather than have unproscribed insider
trading, in which case the fund would simply participate pro rata
in the increased value firms might have if the insiders' trading had
the stipulated beneficial effects.
Insider Trading Will Increase Management's Risk Propensity
Managers are employed by only one corporation. They are also
undiversified in their employment, obtaining the bulk of their in-
come from the corporation. It may follow that they are more risk-
averse than shareholders, who are the more widely diversified
capital participants in the firm.56
Insider trading, according to this argument, increases manage-
ment's tolerance for risk. When managers know that they can
participate in the rise of share prices by accumulating shares while
avoiding losses by unloading falling shares, they will have an incen-
tive to embark on projects that provide insider trading opportuni-
ties. These are projects with outcomes that include an element of
surprise-risky projects that are likely to cause fluctuation in the
share prices. Yet management would not be expected to choose
projects with low or negative expected values. Management can
only profit from the price rises because section 16(c) of the 1934
Act forbids short selling to officers and directors. 57 They will,
therefore, prefer volatility only to a steady rise, not to a greater
one. Still, a promising project with steady performance offers insid-
ers more profit opportunities with less risk than an inferior volatile
venture. Compensation with options and bonuses does not offer this
opportunity to profit from volatility because, in order to do so, the
corporation must constantly reissue or amend the options on very
short notice whenever the share price bottoms out. Such swift and
accurate corporate action is unlikely.
Along these lines, Jensen and Meckling in their seminal article' s
see similarities between management's and creditors' attitudes to-
ward risk: management wants the firm to remain healthy at all
costs in order to protect salaries, just as bondholders hope for firm
11 See Haddock & Macey, oupra note 23, at 1162 (citing Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1984)).
15 U.S.C. S 78p(c) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful ... to sell ... if the person selling
... (1) does not own the security sold ... .
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 46.
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stability to protect the interest and principal of their bonds. Since
neither group generally participates in the profits exceeding, re-
spectively, their salary or interest payments, they wish the firm to
avoid risks that might earn profits in which they would not partic-
ipate. 59
Clark takes the opposite position, claiming that management is
already too risk-prone.60 The relationship between management and
the shareholders is, in his view, like that between debtor and
creditor. Only the debtor and owner of the residual enjoys a rise
in the firm's value, while only the creditor is harmed by a drop.
Just as owners of deeply indebted firms have an incentive to take
excessive risks, so management, according to Clark, enjoys only the
benefits of an increase in value, not the harm of a decrease. Pro-
fessor Clark's view, however, is not shared in the related literature,
where the prevailing view is that a decrease in the firm's value
attributed to bad management diminishes the value of management's
human capital. According to Clark, permitting insider trading will
make management take even greater risks, to the detriment of
shareholders. Thus, the basis of Clark's argument, that management
is too risk-preferring, does not seem to be widely accepted.
Under the assumption that concern for the value of their human
capital restrains management, Carlton and Fischel6 1 defend even
short selling by insiders.62 They argue that short selling, unlike
compensation through options and bonuses, enables managers to
profit on the downside of their projects, thus increasing manage-
ment's risk propensity even further. Under a short selling regime,
however, management can profit from a project with a negative
expected value. There is no reason to permit a perverse incentive
and hope that the markets will take care of it, even if theory
reassures us that they would. The markets must not only be efficient
but look efficient, too. The appearance of impropriety increases the
chances that investors' fear will drive them from the markets,
causing a less liquid, less efficient market.
Bondholders, who are owed a fixed amount, do not care about excessive profits
even if such profits are obtained at the expense of only a slight increase of risk to their
principal. On the other hand, shareholders get nothing if the value of the firm equals
the amount owed to its creditors and are hence indifferent between this value and zero
value. They have nothing to lose and everything to gain from a gamble to increase the
firm's value.
R. CLARK, supra note 42, at 267, S 8.2.1.
6' Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 858.
Short selling is prohibited by section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(c) (1988).
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Compensation packages (including bonuses and options) are only
slightly different from insider trading in their effect on manage-
ment's attitude towards risk. Apart from the comparisons already
made above, there is concern that insider trading profits are poten.
tially unlimited. Profits from options, on the other hand, are limited
to the gains from the number of options held by the insider. Hence
options induce even greater risk-taking than does insider trading.
While insider trading can encourage management to pursue a "low
risk-low gains" strategy in order to stake as much capital as possible
with little risk and still make a handsome profit, managers with a
specific number of options must achieve substantial results for the
corporation in order to produce substantial gains, and this they can
do only by seeking high-return projects, which usually involve more
risk.
Insider Trading Will Signal Good Managers63
The signalling argument is the least convincing argument that
insider trading minimizes agency costs. If insider trading is part of
management's compensation, then only the best managers, those
confident they have the skill to affect the corporation's share price
positively, will accept compensation with a lower base salary, ex-
pecting the remainder in insider trading profits. 64 The confident
managers will distinguish ("signal") themselves from the rest. This
This discussion of agency costs omits the argument that when compensation includes
insider trading, the firm pays more than the insider gets. Here again, insider trading
operates exactly as options do.
This argument claims that, as the present price of a firm's stock anticipates its future
prospects, the appreciation from good outcomes that the market has already anticipated
will be minimal and will not provide insiders an opportunity for profits. On this view,
insiders can profit only from unexpected good results. To those who adopt this hypothesis,
insiders face an uphill struggle to profit from insider trading and rational risk-averse
insiders should prefer not to tie their compensation to the contingency of achieving
unexpected performance for the firm.
Under this argument; insiders do not see the compensation from insider trading the
way a risk neutral person would, Consequently, the insiders should prefer positions with
less total compensation but containing a larger fixed cash portion, thus wasting their
value to society. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in J. PRATT &
R. ZECKHAUSER (eds.), PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 87-89 (1985).
Compensation with stock options has the exact same result. So why have they survived
and indeed prevailed? The answer should be that all the compensation packages contain
options to induce efficiency. Without this incentive, the value of the manager's work is
so much lower (because of increased agency costs, high risk of conflict of interests, and
so on) that a position without such a compensation arrangement just cannot compete in
payout with salaries including options. In such a case, the above argument completely
misses the target.
Carlton & Fisehel, supra note 1, at 867.
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group, however, is not necessarily identical to the group of able
managers. Confidence is hardly an exclusive companion of dexterity.
The signalling argument is also founded on the predictability of
the firm's future performance, since "able" managers have to be
capable of assessing the prospects of the firm under their helm in
order to decide on accepting the contingent compensation through
insider trading. A business cycle without surprises, however, is the
exception rather than the rule. Firms operate in an unpredictable
environment whose unpredictability varies with the risks of the
industry in which each firm competes. In a highly unpredictable
environment, the signalling argument is reversed: good managers
who would command high salaries would not want to risk them on
the firm's uncertain prospects. By contrast, less competent manag-
ers, unable to garner a high salary, would be more willing to take
a chance for the higher pay they could not otherwise earn.
Compensation packages (including stock options and bonuses) re-
sult in exactly the same signalling effect. They are more attractive
to good (or optimistic) managers than to bad (or pessimistic) ones.
With regard to their effect on agency costs, the difference between
insider trading and stock options is only marginal. They are equally
effective as methods of compensation that promote efficiency and
they have the same signalling effect. Only in the area of increasing
the risk propensity of management do they differ, but in peculiar
way: each has an advantage not enjoyed by the other. Insider
trading allows management to profit from volatility more than
options do, thus increasing management's tolerance for risk. On the
other hand, options, which are limited in amount, do not allow for
a low-risk strategy that would lead to small but sure gains which
could be tapped through an immense insider trading scheme.
Arguments Based on Notions of Evolutionary Process
Proponents of insider trading find significance in the fact that
such trading was never forbidden by contract; it has survived the
test of time for a century. Easterbrook supports this position by
suggesting a possible evolutionary process.65 Each incumbent man-
agement team would have an incentive to prohibit insider trading
by young managers and be the only trading insiders in the company
in order to maximize their own wealth. Since this has failed to
happen for many management generations, we are left to infer that
insider trading survived this evolutionary process on its merits.
Without challenging Easterbrook's empirical data, there are some
objections to his reasoning. First of all, it would show questionable
' Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 90.
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ethics if incumbent management engaged in a practice that it pro-
hibited for subordinates. Management also would not want to call
attention to the issue by even negotiating with junior management
to prohibit insider trading. Publicity of such negotiations could only
harm the inside traders by reopening a settled issue. In addition,
if insider trading hurt stockholders and not fellow traders, there
would be no reason why incumbent management would not want to
share this benefit with the other management ranks. Easterbrook
maintains that if insider trading is inefficient, then incumbent man-
agement will not allow novices to practice it. This prohibition will
increase the firm's return, thereby increasing management's income
(and the value of management's human capital). The boon in such a
case would be negligible. 6
Easterbrook also argues that if insider trading were indeed in-
efficient for the firm, it would not have survived the test of time.
The first firm to ban the practice would gain an advantage over its
competitors. Its stock would command higher prices, thereby low-
ering the cost of raising capital in the markets and forcing other
firms in the industry to follow suit. Every upstart firm has a strong
incentive to adopt measures giving it an advantage over its com-
petitors, and competitive markets therefore would adopt such meas-
ures. Yet firms did not prohibit their insiders' trading. Consequently,
one is left to infer, insider trading is not an inefficient compensation
device. 7 But, indeed, insider trading is not inefficient. It closely
compares with options as a compensation device that promotes
efficiency. The test of time has to be limited: it proved that a
prohibition of insider trading by a specific firm does not increase
efficiency, in the specific firm or in the market.6 This is very
different from concluding that the absence of a prohibition proves
that insider trading is efficient. Insider trading can be irrelevant
to the firm's returns (as distinguished from its effect on the market),
or, if relevant and undesirable, its proscription by the individual
firms could be too expensive.
It depends on the important assumptions that harm to the firm from insider trading
will: (1) reduce insider trading profits of senior management, and (2) thereby cause the
value of the human capital of senior management to drop (even though this value would
not drop from the harm caused by senior sending itself). Both propositions are dubious
at best.
Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 90-91.
Easterbrook points out that the difficulty of policing similarly makes the prohibition
of insider trading by individual firms inefficient. This problem suggests that insider
trading could be introduced only by a general legal rule, not by an individual firm's
charter or by-laws. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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There is one more obstacle in the way of a corporation wishing
to reach an agreement with its managers on insider trading. Insider
trading probably is not very costly for the firm if the firm is
envisioned, as it was traditionally, as an entity separate from its
shareholders. Insider trading does not put a direct financial drain
on the firm and even has beneficial side effects for the corporation.
This means that the ability to trade on inside information has a
greater value for insiders than the costs imposed on the firm. The
field is thus tilted against reaching an agreement limiting insider
trading because in order to persuade insiders to forego trading, the
firm would have to pay more than the benefit it would receive from
the prohibition.
Easterbrook also mentions the impossibility of enforcement as
another argument why the prohibition of insider trading by the
firm is not feasible. 69 Since firms cannot police insider trading,70
why should they proscribe it? Easterbrook reasons that dishonest
managers who intend to trade will be attracted to the firm because
the firm will be paying higher wages to keep its honest managers.
The firm will then find out that it is overcompensating its manage-
ment by giving it high wages in addition to insider trading, and
will reduce salaries, losing the honest managers who would now be
underpaid.
Easterbrook also explains that the difficulty of detecting breaches
will dilute any gains from the prohibition:
[Tihe difficulty of detecting who does and who does not comply
with a prohibition on inside trading also makes it very hard for a
firm to capture the gains of a prohibition, even if the prohibition
is both socially beneficial and perfectly enforced. Suppose firm A
adopts and enforces a prohibition. It communicates the news to
the market, and the price of its stock rises, reflecting the value
of the new measures. Now firm B copies the announcement but
not the enforcement policy. The market will be uncertain whether
firm B in fact has abolished trading by its insiders. The price of
B's stock will reflect the benefits, discounted by the probability of
enforcement. The more firm B looks like firm A to the market,
the higher its price. Many B-type firms will try to take a free ride
on the efforts of A-type firms. The strategy is more profitable to
B than to A, because only A incurs enforcement costs. The more
successful B-type firms are in mimicking the appearance but not
Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 94.
70 Firms never know when management is trading on inside information (nor even
that it is trading) and they do not want to ban all stock ownership by management
(which would make enforcement very easy) because such ownership is beneficial to
everybody.
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the reality of prohibition, the lower the price of A-type stock,
because the market cannot trust A's representations. And if, be-
cause of the mimicry, the A-type firms cannot capture the full
benefits of their enforced prohibition of trading, they too will find
it most profitable to adopt strategy B.71
Since the pretense of a proscription of insider trading is more
profitable than the enforced prohibition, firms that proscribe insider
trading lose the incentives to enforce this policy. They will have
larger benefits by its unenforced proscription. This further suggests
that individual firms do not have the incentive to protect the
interests of the trading public, particularly when the interests of
those firms are well separated from those of the public. Investor
protection must lie elsewhere, with a government agency like the
SEC, or with the courts.
The Problem of the Implicit Nature of Insider Trading as
Compensation
From a legal perspective, the differences mentioned above are
less important that the fact that compensation through stock options
is explicitly contracted for, while insider trading is never endorsed
by the firm. If insider trading is a form of management compensa-
tion, then it should be allowed explicitly. Implied compensation for
fiduciaries is not permitted under state agency law. 72 Two factors
help determine whether insider trading should be considered com-
pensation: (1) the absence of any specific agreement in employment
contracts, and (2) whether insider trading usurps corporate infor-
mation.
The lengthy and persistent absence of any express agreement on
insider trading in employment contracts requires attention. The
silence should be interpreted. One may begin by seeking to deter-
mine the default beneficiary of the trading rights on inside infor-
mation. For assistance, we should examine the nature of a
hypothetical employment contract prohibiting management from
trading on inside information. Indeed, a clause prohibiting manage
mcnt from trading seems to be a contractual detriment to manage
ment, warranting additional consideration from the employer firm.
Thus, the absence of such a clause can only be interpreted as a
prohibition if insider trading were in the control of the firm. The
71 Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 94-95.
72 See R. CLARK, supra note 42, at 280, § 8.3.1. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY S 388 comment c (1958) (prohibiting profit from use of information even without
harm to principal).
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firm would have to allow management to engage in it by a clause
that would have value to management. But it seems that insider
trading was a common practice in the stock exchanges; hence, such
a clause would have little value for management.78 It is not a term
handed by the firms to management in the sense discussed above.
Historically, insider trading was perceived to affect only sharehold-
ers, as distinct from their corporations. As a result, it was not
prohibited by default in a silent employment contract. Since man-
agement was not restrained from it, insider trading cannot be
considered compensation handed to management silently by the
firms.
It must be stressed that the issue is how to distinguish between
a legitimate and a fraudulent variation of the same practice. Until
recently, common law fraud rules were considered sufficient. Insider
trading has become the target of stricter regulation only since the
1960s, when, coincidentally, the prospect of computerized monitoring
of market transactions dramatically reduced the costs of detecting
and enforcing the prohibition.
If a form of insider trading is legitimate in the eyes of the law,
and management receives its benefits as the default beneficiary,
then insider trading cannot be a compensation arrangement because
the law already permits it. However, some forms of insider trading
are unquestionably fraudulent. A firm's permission for employees
to commit fraud is hardly a compensation device, since the decision
making that leads to a permission to trade on inside information is
skewed. The firms will permit a practice from which they are only
indirectly injured, the direct victims being the shareholders and
market participants. Consequently, these are "aggravated" kinds of
insider trading that do not withstand criticism by disguising them
as forms of compensation. Once again, the problem reduces to one
of where the line between legal and illegal insider trading will be
drawn.
71 However, a prohibition of insider trading derived from agency law is possible. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 comment c (1958) (prohibiting profit from use
of information even without harm to principal, Is insider trading illegal under this rule,
with no need for special fraud rules? Maybe not. Corporate officers conceivably could
invoke the business judgment rule were the allocation of such information challenged.
The discussion thus centers on the notion of "rights in information" as a ground for thc
proscription of insider trading, even though as we saw, insider trading normally tends
to be considered fraudulent, Beyond proving the infinite complexity and interdependency
of the world, it is worth remembering that this point comes up only in the discussion
of insider trading as a compensation device The vagueness and breadth of the notion
of fraud gives a more complete explanation of the insider trading rules.
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Whether insider trading usurps corporate information, in violation
of agency law, 74 brings us once more to the most crucial issue in
the insider trading debate, the nature of this information. Catego-
rizing forms of information, one of the most evanescent intangibles,
is obviously difficult. The related literature often refers to "soft"
and "hard" information, but the definitions are far from clear. Hard
information includes all information about the past, all historical
information. Soft information comprises all uncertainties and expec-
tations for the future. However, there is an intermediate area of
information about the immediate future that can reach a higher
degree of certainty than the more remote soft information. When
is information sufficiently certain so that acting on it is equivalent
to profiting from it (because of the extremely low risk involved)? It
appears that this is the point where a distinction should be drawn
between usurping corporate information and trading on educated
estimates of the future. Trading on "knowledge" should be consid-
ered compensation, while trading on estimates should not only be
considered the right of insiders, but should even be encouraged
because of its incentive effects. Notice that trading on "knowledge"
provides weaker incentives, because the relevant event is expected
anyway. By contrast, if managers' actions can affect the fulfillment
of these expectations, the managers' trading on these expectations
should enhance their efforts.
CROSS INSIDER TRADING
The Legal Analysis
In cross insider trading, the holder of the informational advantage
trades in stock other than that of the corporation with which he
has a fiduciary relationship. An alien corporation is the object of
the crosstrader's inside information, while the crosstrader's own
corporation is the source. The distinction between cross and classical
insider trading can now be made because insider trading has been
confined to the classical variation.
The interpretation of Rule 10b-5 as a prohibition against insider
trading started with In re Cady, Roberts and SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur.75 These cases found a fraud violating Rule 10b-5 if a
possessor of "material nonpublic" information did not disclose the
14 R. CLARK, supra note 42, at 280 (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
388 comment c (1958) (prohibiting profit from use of information even without harm to
principal)).
71 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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information before trading (the "disclose or abstain" rule). The
definition of insider trading did not develop strong reliance on the
existence of a fiduciary relationship until Chiarella v. United States.7 6
In that case a fiduciary's breach of the duty to disclose was held
to be a prerequisite for a Rule 10b-5 violation. This explicit require-
ment of a fiduciary link between the insider and the other side of
the trade is a major pivotal point in the interpretation of Rule 10b-
5. There were two immediate reactions: (1) The SEC promulgated
Rule 14e-3, which eliminated the "fiduciary breach" requirement in
all tender offer-related cases of insider trading;77 and (2) the Second
Circuit adopted the misappropriation theory in United States v.
Newman,7 an interpretation of 10b-5 aspiring to award liability
regardless of a fiduciary duty. Under this theory, there is a 10b-5
fraud if improperly obtained material nonpublic information is used
for trading.7 9 The "in connection with a purchase or sale of securi-
ties" requirement of Rule 10b-5 is satisfied because the misappro-
priator trades. The person with whom the insider trades is irrelevant;
fraud consists in taking (misappropriating) the information.
The Second Circuit, however, denied a private right of action
based on the same facts in Moss v. Morgan Stanley.8 0 But a recent
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act overrules Moss. The
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
permits private rights of action for contemporaneous traders in all
insider trading cases."1 While this legislative development overrules
Moss, it does not directly interfere with the interpretation of Rule
10b-5, neither endorsing nor rejecting the misappropriation theory.
The Carpenter 2 decision split the Supreme Court on the application
of the misappropriation theory to rule 10b-5 cases, frustrating those
who were looking to the Court for guidance. The Court may have
split over one or more of three possible problems. There could have
been difficulties with the merits of the misappropriation theory
itself. There could have been problems with its application to the
76 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. S 240.14e-3 (1988). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
71 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd on remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983).
71 See Aldave, supra note 2, at 114.
553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
81 Section 20A(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78t-l(a) (West Pocket Part 1989).
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). See supra note 6 and accompanying
text. See also Crespi, The Availability After Carpenter of Private Rights of Action Under
Rule lob 5 Based Upon the Misappropriation of If.-vrmn Hon Conerning A cyisi4tians. 26
AM. Bus. L.J. 709 (1989); Beck-Dudley & Stephens, The Efficient Market Theory and
I~t.dr Trading: Are We Headed in the Right Direction?, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 441 (1989).
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facts in this case, because Winans, the defendant, produced the
exploitable information himself. It is unclear whether a "physical"
taking is required. Alternatively, the problem may have been whether
the misappropriation theory should apply when the defrauded en-
tity, the Wall Street Journal, is not a market participant in any
way, thus implying a failure to satisfy the 10b-5 requirement of a
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
The decision itself is not very helpful in this respect. After
reciting the decisions of the courts below, the Court dispensed with
the securities laws with a single sentence: "The Court is evenly
divided with respect to the convictions under the securities laws
and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those counts."8 3
The Court was careful not to commit itself. One way to discover
the reasoning underlying this statement is to proceed by elimination.
The first possibility is that the Court split over the merits of the
misappropriation theory. Carpenter, however, was an innovative and
courageous decision with respect to mail and wire fraud interpre-
tation, as commentators have suggested.8 4 A few months before
Carpenter the Court decided McNally v. United States," where mail
and wire fraud was held to be "limited in scope to the protection
of property rights." 6 However, in Carpenter this limitation was
interpreted to include intangible property rights. Commentators
have argued that Carpenter weakens the McNally limitation, because
a change in the pleadings would be sufficient to satisfy the new
mail and wire fraud interpretation. Intangible rights will merely be
expressed as intangible property rights, which is quite plausible if
they are exclusive and economically exploitable. 7 If the Court took
such an aggressive course in the interpretation of the mail and wire
fraud statutes, would it not seem strange to conclude that the
Justices shied away from the misappropriation theory? The view
that the Supreme Court does not disapprove of the misappropriation
theory also might be slightly encouraged by the denial of certiorari
in United States v. Newman.88
484 U.S. at 24.
8 See Bagby, supra note 2, at 206. See generally Note, The Mail and Wire Fraud
Statute's Protection of Property Extends to Intangibles Such as Confidential Business
Information: Carpenter v. United States, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1539 (1988).
483 U.S. 350 (1987).
Id. at 360.
See generally Note, supra note 84, at 1554; Coffee, The Criminal Law Status of
Confidential Business Information 15-19 (unpublished draft, Oct. 4, 1988) Cf. Bagby, supra
note 2, at 205 n.7.
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), affld on remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983).
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One might suppose that the Court split over application of this
rule to Winans because he personally produced the information he
"misappropriated." However, this possibility must also be rejected
because the same objection was dismissed in relation to the mail
and wire fraud counts. The defendant also used the Journal's sched-
ule of publication for the timing of his trades. This schedule was
not his creation, but the Journal's.89
The element surviving elimination is that the Court split over
whether the misappropriation theory should apply in a case where
the "misappropriatee" did not trade in the market. Commentators"
have pointed to the fact that since the defrauded entity, the Wall
Street Journal, was not a participant in the marketplace, no fraud
was committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."9' This thorny unresolved issue puts into question the
applicability of Rule 10b-5 in this case. Consequently, this last
alternative is the most likely reason for the Court's reluctance to
take a position in Carpenter.
The misappropriation theory posits that a Rule 10b-5 fraud is
perpetrated by the misappropriation of the information and the
subsequent use of it for profit. The purpose of the introduction of
the misappropriation theory was to avoid the Chiarella paradox,
which allows the use of inside information in trading in stock of
"strangers," corporations to whose shareholders the trader does not
owe a duty to disclose. The Chiarella paradox is founded on the
notion that there is a Rule 10b-5 fraud only where the insider owes
the victim a fiduciary duty to disclose. However, the misappropri-
ation theory did not cure the Chiarella paradox. The paradox arose
again because the Court searched for a trading victim of the mis-
appropriation in order to find fraud in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, as Rule 10b-5 requires.
By contrast, the fraud-on-the-market theory used in the merger
negotiations disclosure context does not require a close connection
between the perpetrator and the victim. On the contrary, the fraud-
on-the-market theory serves the purpose of partially overcoming
the connection requirement by easing the reliance standard. Fraud-
See Carpenter 484 U.S. at 25-26 (contents and timing of the column are property
rights of the Journal).
1 Note, supra note 84, at 1551 ("[S]ome scholars feel that the fraud ... was not
sufficiently 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ....')
- 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (1988). Although it accepted such "connection with purchase
or sale," the Second Circuit noted that it was "very tenuous indeed." United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981). Cf. id. at 20 (Dumbauld, J., dissenting) (dissenting
on the "connection" point, but concurring in the mail and wire fraud conviction).
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on-the-market may assist in overcoming the Chiarella paradox. Re-
liance by investors may exist without a fiduciary duty owed to them
by an alien corporation's management. However, it does not create
a duty to disclose on the latter's part. The fraud-on-the-market
theory provides that trading at wrong prices is equivalent to being
defrauded. It reinforces the view that accuracy in securities prices
is a goal of Rule 10b-5. 92 Once this crucial connection is accepted,
any behavior causing inaccurate securities prices can be character-
ized as a 10b-5 fraud. Of course, a fiduciary duty was still present
in Basic, running from the nondisclosing management to the inves-
tors. Essentially, the misappropriation theory is unnecessary; it was
held, indirectly, to have nothing to add.93
Therefore, the choices confronted in a cross insider trading case
are similar to those present in Carpenter. First, the misappropriation
theory may require that the object of the misappropriation be a
market participant. This, however, would still permit cross insider
trading while retaining unity of interpretation with Chiarella. Sec-
ond, market participation by the misappropriation victim could be
ignored, thereby banning cross insider trading. This, however, would
force Rule 10b-5 into the threshold of state law, and would replace
the "disclose or abstain" rule by a more complex but substantially
identical theory.94 Finally, Chiarella could be overruled and the
"disclose or abstain" theory could be accepted without the require-
ment of a fiduciary link, thereby accepting "the market" as the
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 24142 ("'The fraud on the market theory is
based on the hypothesis that ... the price of a company's stock is determined by the
available material information .... Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchas-
ers of stock.
0 All other things being equal, the misappropriation theory is inferior to the previous
interpretations of Rule 10b-5. The misappropriation theory is logically more remote,
assigning liability for the taking of information instead of having a notion of "fraudulent
trading." It almost duplicates the rule that fiduciaries should not profit from their
employer's information, a rule that is entirely contained in state agency law. The Supreme
Court has objected to the development of 10b-5 interpretation into the area of state law
in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977). See generally Brooks,
Rule lob-5 in the Balance: An Analysis of The Supreme Court's Policy Perspective, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 403 (1980); Ferrara & Steinberg, The Interplay Between State Corporate
and Federal Securities Law, 7 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 5 (1982); Ferrara & Steinberg,
Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and The New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263,
266 (1980); Gorman, At The Intersection of Supreme Avenue and Circuit Street: The Focus
of Section 10(b) and Santa Fe's Footnote 14, 7 J. CoRP. L. 199, 200-06, 224-25 (1982);
Stricklin Krendl, The Progeny of Santa Fe v. Green: An Analysis of the Elements of a
Fiduciary Duty Claim Under Rule lob-5 and a Case for Federal Corporation Law, 59
N.C. L. REV. 231, 231, 315-21 (1981).
4 See supra note 93.
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object of the fraud. This would unify the interpretation of Rule 10b-
5 for both insider trading and merger negotiations disclosure pur-
poses. If cross insider trading is undesirable, the Court should
overrule Chiarella and reinstate the "disclose or abstain" theory,
while relaxing the restraint of requiring a narrow fiduciary duty in
order to mandate disclosure. Alternatively, if overruling Chiarella
is impossible, it could be best for the Court to relax the market
participation requirement before applying the misappropriation the-
ory.
The Proposed Vehicle to a Cross Insider Trading Proscription:
Fraud on the Market
Recall that shareholder injury from classical insider trading
95
founded on fraud-on-the-market causation is slightly broader than
the form accepted in Basic.9 6 Shareholders were injured because
they traded at a fraudulent price, while the trading insiders breached
their duty to disclose nonpublic information to fellow shareholders.
However, in cross insider trading the existence of a similar duty is
not so clear. In classical insider trading there is a judicially accepted
duty to disclose the information on which the insider is trading.
This duty is founded on the fiduciary relationship between manage-
ment and shareholders. In cross insider trading this duty is not
established. By contrast, Chiarella implies that lack of a fiduciary
link with the insider's counterparty absolves the insider of a duty
to disclose. Establishing such a duty to disclose is the hurdle
towards a proscription of cross insider trading.
If there is a duty to disclose in cross insider trading similar to
the duty in classical insider trading, then the injury analysis is
identical. Trading shareholders are injured because their transac-
tions occur at the wrong prices due to the nondisclosure of insider
information by the cross traders.
The insiders' obligation to disclose is absent if there is no fiduciary
relationship. Although this is true in the context of a fiduciary duty
based on corporate law, Rule 10b-5 should be interpreted consis-
tently with its purpose of protecting the integrity of the markets.
Insider trading fraud, based on Rule 10b-5, should not be limited to
intracorporate fraud. The duty to disclose should be based on a
duty to the market participants. Precedent for this duty is found
in the foundations of the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Basic case
and its progeny. Once this duty is established, Rule 10b-5 applies
95 See supra text accompanying notes 15-32.
See supra note 18.
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without further complications and without the fiduciary relationship
limitation imposed by Chiarella. The following exposition of the
cross insider trading policy supports this recommendation.
The Policy Debate
There is no well developed policy debate regarding cross insider
trading.97 The similarities between classical and cross insider trading
create the false impression that the same policy considerations apply
in each case. Classical insider trading is addressed as a conflict
between insiders and shareholders. By contrast, cross insider trad-
ing places insiders opposite the market in general. Only a few
arguments apply to both forms of insider trading. These are the
arguments that focus on the effect insider trading has on the
markets. These include the arguments that address the traders'
injuries based on nondisclosure, 98 Wang's argument that price move-
ments are unevenly distributed in favor of insiders, and the debate
on how insider trading affects stock pricing.
The other arguments related to the insider trading debate are
out of place in a debate on cross trading. The flow-of-information-
to-the-markets argument, the entire agency cost discussion, and the
management compensation issue are not applicable to cross insider
trading, either because these arguments assume that the insiders
are managers of the corporation in whose stock they trade or
because they focus on the insider/managers' relationship with share-
holders.
A distinctive feature of cross insider trading is that it raises
more serious conflicts of interest than classical insider trading, both
in the takeover context and in everyday corporate life. It is useful
to examine the nature of the conflict of interest posed by cross
insider trading in both contexts.
Conflict of Interests in Takeovers
Apart from the obvious injury cross insider trading inflicts on
acquirers by raising the target's price,99 cross insider trading mis-
The trading on inside information not included under the Chiarella limitation does
not even have an accepted name. Some refer to it as outsider trading, which leaves
outsiders who have no information advantage with no name. See supra note 2. See also
Aldave, supra note 2, at 112; Bagby, supra note 2.
The sole difference in the analytical process is the lack of a Chiarella-type fiduciary
duty to disclose. This article advocates overruling this limitation. The "fraud on the
market" notion suggests that the market needs protection regardless of the relationship
between the perpetrator of the fraud and the market participants. See supra text
accompanying notes 95-97.
Insider trading will increase demand for the target stock and thereby raise its
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aligns the interests of insiders and shareholders to such an extent
that it creates conflicts of interest. If insiders are allowed to trade,
they may pursue trading profits instead of a sensible corporate
policy. When deciding on corporate policy, managers who can profit
by trading in the stock of the acquired firm may view takeovers as
more lucrative, because they provide an extra and secret bonus for
management. Under such pressures, insiders may engage in more
takeovers than they might have otherwise. Theory suggests man-
agers will engage in takeovers until the return from them is not
obviously negative for their firm.100
However, this point will not be the optimum for the acquirer's
shareholders or for the economy. Shareholders want only those
takeovers that make sense economically, and that are profitable for
the firm, not only for its insiders. The economy needs only those
takeovers that create value, not takeovers that just reshuffle cor-
porate assets.
This adverse effect is generated by cross-trading, and not by
classical insider trading. Because in classical insider trading insiders
are trading only in the stock of their own corporation, their interests
do not deviate greatly from the interests of most other shareholders.
The major result of this is an increase in management's risk pro-
pensity. Although it is unlikely that management would pursue
actions that negatively impact share value, insider trading would
permit management to profit on volatility. If insiders' "short" selling
is prohibited by section 16(c) of the 1934 Act, there are no instances,
other than cross trading, in which insiders can profit from a project
that does not also have a positive expected value for the sharehold-
ers.
Conflict of Interests In Situations Not Associated With Takeovers
While takeovers have been and may be expected to remain a
central object of regulation and debate, the previous analysis on
the effects of cross-insider trading on takeovers may be moot. Rule
14e-3 prohibits all trading on nonpublic information concerning pend-
price. This happens either directly or indirectly through its informational effect, if the
effect of demand alone is considered insufficient. If the price rise of the target causes
the acquirer to increase its bid higher than it would have absent such trading, then
insider trading increases the acquirer's total takeover expenses.
100 At that point, the value of the insiders' human capital will begin to be put in
jeopardy, suggesting that they will stop there. Nothing guarantees this, but the as-
sumption of rational decision making by management suggests it. The risk of manage-
ment's turning irrational under strange external pressures, such as an imminent personal
bankruptcy, is disccunrtd in the prica of stok- S-e, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note
1, at 872.
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ing tender offers. There is no analogous rule, however, concerning
other corporate transactions that have a similar potential to move
stock prices.
To illustrate, consider a big corporation with a stable and estab-
lished business, a fictional McDonnell Douglas. At a certain point
this corporation decides to subcontract some of its business. Several
small corporations compete for these contracts, which are huge by
their standards. The stock market discounts the probability of
getting the pending contract for each and prices the stock accord-
ingly. The corporations that do not trade publicly do not receive
such attention. These contestants fall into three categories: (1) the
corporations that the market considers likely to get the contract,
(2) those that are considered unlikely to get the contract, and (3)
the private corporations that are not traded. Corporations in the
first category will increase in value only modestly if they actually
get the contract. The contract award is not a surprise, so the market
will already have priced them for this expectation. Corporations in
the second category will experience a substantial price rise, because
they were a long shot with lower odds of winning the contract. If
management of the prime contractor is allowed to trade in suppliers'
stock, then it will have an incentive to review only candidates in
the second category due to the opportunity they offer for a sub-
stantial appreciation. At the other end, unlisted candidates will be
reviewed only if required to do so. This form of trading creates an
obvious distortion in decision making, and the traders' profits are
not shared with the traders' corporations.
Classical insider trading results in no such distortion of manage-
ment's decision making in similar cases. If the managers of the
fictional McDonnell Douglas trade in their own corporation's stock,
their incentive will be to pick the subcontractor that will benefit
their corporation. They are indifferent about the effect that the
contract award has on these other companies.
Counter-Arguments to Cross Insider Trading
A Prohibition of Cross-Trading Did Not Emerge on the Markets
Neither investors nor corporations have tried to ban cross insider
trading. Presumably, this argument, which has been used by Eas-
terbrook to criticize the regulation of classical insider trading, 01
could be used as well against a proposal to prohibit cross-trading.
Companies that present cross-trading opportunities are the firms
" See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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that can affect the future of other companies, usually only very
large corporations.
The evolutionary process, however, can hardly work in these
circumstances. The evolutionary process would impose a clause
prohibiting cross-trading by making the market realize that new
issues of stock are more attractive if the issuer prohibits cross-
trading. However, young upstart firms do not face the problems
that cross-trading generates. The prospect of becoming big and
having a big impact on other firms is uncertain and lies a number
of years down the road. Not even the investors have such a long-
term perspective as to change their valuation for the "new issue"
if it includes a prohibition of cross insider trading. Not only will
the prohibition apply after several years, but the proportional value
of such a clause is minimal in view of the gigantic appreciation due
to the growth of the upstart into a major corporation. Because it
does not appear that there is any competitive advantage in devel-
oping such a clause prohibiting cross-trading, little importance should
be assigned to the fact that it has not developed.
Should All Other Stock Ownership of Management Be Forbidden?
One would assume that, if cross insider trading is bad, a rule
prohibiting all stock ownership by management would be beneficial.
The argument could be made that management would rather influ-
ence the price of a stock it owns than that of a "stranger." Although
this sounds correct, it does not correspond to reality. The scheme
of having insiders who own stock in the suppliers or the subcon-
tractors of their own corporation is different from cross-trading.
Insiders might exercise less control over the subcontractors because
if they fire the subcontractors their stock holdings will depreciate.
However, it is crucial to avoid distortions in corporate decision
making, and the original award of the contract is the most important
decision point. Thereafter, management can always sell its holdings
before a subcontractor is fired. Unless management members are
pursuing an active investment strategy in their personal finances,
it is unusual for them to own large amounts of stock in a corporation
that might be a candidate for such a contract. Normally they will
be following a personal investment strategy of diversification. It
can safely be assumed that the chance of a minuscule additional
return will not drive management away from sound decision making
practices. By contrast, if managers are allowed to trade in the
subcontractor's stock, their returns could rise substantially.
Cross-Trading Is Not Embraced by Self-Dealing
The example of managers, who already own substantial amounts
of the target of the preferential treatment, is different. Here, there
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is not unfair trading, but there is the potential for unfair decision
making. This situation should be addressed along with self dealing
Allegations of self-dealing, however, cannot be triggered by cross-
trading because of the difference in the order of events. In cross-
trading thore is no prior stock ownership in the corporation that
receives preferential treatment by the insiders.
In a typical cross trading transaction, the decision for the corpo
ration to subcontract comes first. Thereafter, management deter-
mines the beneficiary corporation. At this point self-dealing could
arise if management had a substantial ownership interest in the
corporation selected. In cross-trading, however, management's de-
cision making is influenced at a time when there is no ownership
in the recipient of this preferential treatment. Only after the deci-
sion will management profit through the stock purchase and the
announcement of the recipient. In this ordering of events, self-
dealing does not apply.
CONCLUSION
Cross-trading, or insider trading across corporations, is more
undesirable than classical insider trading. Although no regulatory
action is directly suggested here, a change in the law to proscribe
cross insider trading would be beneficial. This article suggests that
the adoption by Basic of the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish
the element of reliance in a Rule 10b-5 case affirms that the goal
of Rule 10b-5 is accurate securities prices. Attainment of this goal
will be furthered by proscribing cross insider trading. This could
be accomplished by imposing a wider duty to disclose that is not
based exclusively on a traditional fiduciary relationship. A regula-
tion to the effect that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated
regardless of a fiduciary duty link between the trader and the
victim would have this result. However, one should not expect such
a development, in view of the tendency to leave the interpretation
of Rule 10b-5 to the courts. It is best left to the initiative of the
same courts that read the fiduciary duty requirement into Rule 10b-
5 to now extract it, a position consistent with the Blackmun-Marshall
dissent in Chiarella.10 2
This article has dealt with both classical and cross insider trading.
Numerous arguments have been presented and evaluated. First,
using the fraud-on-the-market theory, this article introduced an
analysis of shareholder injury attributed to insider trading. Nondis-
closure by insiders of their information causes investors to trade
1- See 445 U.S. at 246-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
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at incorrect prices to their detriment. The argument that insider
trading redistributes price moves in favor of insiders was found
valid, but was found to be only a minor problem.
Insider trading arguably can increase capital market efficiency.
But the only way insider trading beneficially moves prices is through
revelation of the insiders' estimates of share values, Secret insider
trading leaves prices unaffected. This supports commentators'
suggestions for speedier filing of insiders' trades. Freedom to en-
gage in insider trading, however, can provide an incentive for
management to release earlier news about the corporation.
Although a case can be made that freedom to engage in insider
trading could reduce agency costs, this reduction is financed entirely
by the shareholders who trade frequently. An insider trading pro-
hibition does not necessarily benefit shareholders because, after
management, the group most likely to take advantage of the inside
information is market professionals. Insider trading has the bene-
ficial effect of aligning management's risk propensity with that of
the investors. Insider trading decreases agency costs only through
a signalling process primarily for firms that operate in safe envi-
ronments, a rarity in the real world. In addition, any signalling
effect of insider trading could be duplicated by means such as
compensation through options and bonuses.
In contrast to classical insider trading, cross insider trading has
been found unquestionably undesirable. Cross-trading produces acute
conflicts of interest where it induces management to actions that
might be adverse to the corporation's performance. Due to this
conflict, the requirement of a fiduciary relationship in Rule 10b-5
fraud cases should be eliminated, Fortunately, the Supreme Court
did not commit itself to accepting the misappropriation theory in
Carpenter. It is submitted that, by using the rationale behind the
acceptance of fraud on the market in Basic, it is appropriate to
overrule the fiduciary link requirement of Chiarolla. This suggests
that a prohibition of cross insider trading can easily be based on
the traditional "disclose or abstain" legal theory, a more satisfactory
interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5 than the misappropriation theory.
